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Flu pandemic planning
There is currently international concern that an influenza pandemic is
imminent. This article outlines the background to this concern and what
steps are being put in place to address it.
Pandemic influenza is a strain of influenza A which usually derives from
an animal reservoir. The strain has to mutate or recombine with other
strains to become capable of (a) infecting humans; and (b) being easily
passed between humans (human-human transmission). Because this strain of
influenza is novel in humans it is passed rapidly through populations -
which are unlikely to have significant prior immunity - and gives rise to a
world-wide 'pandemic'.
Clinical attack rates for a pandemic influenza may be 25-50% of the
population, with mortality in affected individuals in the region of
0.37-2.5%. Initial mortality rates before a strain becomes well
adapted to humans may be much higher (e.g. >50%).
Historically flu pandemics have occurred with a frequency of 11-42 years.
The last pandemic was in 1968/9, so it is thought another may be due soon.
Seasonal vs pandemic influenza
Flu pandemics can be distinguished from 'seasonal' influenza epidemics in
a number of ways:
- pandemic influenza may occur during any season
seasonal epidemics usually occur in winter
- pandemic influenza may affect any age group -
including young healthy adults (who usually make up the bulk of a
nation's workforce)
seasonal epidemics usually affect the young, elderly and
immunocompromised predominantly
- pandemic influenza virulence (ability to
infect and cause severe illness) can vary and is difficult to predict
prior to significant numbers of clinical cases
- pandemic influenza usually occurs worldwide
once every few decades
seasonal influenza is usually annual and outbreaks are usually
limited to smaller geographical areas
- because a number of adaptations need to occur
for an influenza strain to become a pandemic strain, there is an
inevitable delay in being able to produce vaccine to combat pandemic flu
a seasonal influenza vaccine is usually available prior to significant
numbers of clinical cases
The emergence of a strain of bird flu (avian influenza) - H5N1 - in the
last few years which is affecting birds in Asia, Europe and Africa, and a
small number of humans in SE and Central Asia and the Middle East has
sharpened the minds of public health planners and contingency plans are
rapidly being drawn up to cope with a possible pandemic (see
Contingency planning, below).
Whilst the first step required for a pandemic influenza has been
fulfilled (transmission between animals and humans), at this stage there is
no evidence of sustained transmission between humans, so this is not yet a
pandemic strain. However, the fear is that with increasing numbers of
poultry affected across the world it may be a matter of time before the
virus adapts better to humans.
Countries reporting poultry cases of H5N1 to date
Afghanistan, Albania, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Cambodia, Cameroon, China, Cote d'Ivoire,
Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Djibouti, Egypt, France, Georgia,
Germany, Greece, Hong Kong, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq,
Israel, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, S Korea, Laos, Malaysia,
Mongolia, Myanmar, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Palestinian territories,
Poland, Romania, Russia, Serbia and Montenegro, Slovakia, Slovenia,
Spain, Sudan, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Turkey, Ukraine, United
Kingdom, Vietnam
Countries reporting human cases
of H5N1 to date
Azerbaijan, Cambodia, China, Dijibouti, Egypt, Indonesia, Iraq,
Thailand, Turkey, Vietnam
Sources:
OIE,
WHO,
Promed
DEFRA has set up a telephone helpline (08459 33 55 77) for members of
the public if they find birds in the UK which which appear to have died from
an unexplained cause. Single deaths should not be notified unless they
are fowl (swans, ducks or geese).
Actions proposed to prepare for and manage an influenza pandemic are
based on the following principles:
- surveillance - for new cases in animals +/- humans
- infection control - including basic hygiene measures, isolation of
cases (voluntary if possible), prevention of large-scale gatherings,
restriction of travel between infected and non-infected areas (where
possible)
- medical prophylaxis/treatment - use of antivirals and vaccine (when
available), both according to predetermined priorities in the event of
insufficient supply
- staff protection - plan for a diminished workforce both in the
healthcare sector and elsewhere
- overburdening of healthcare facilities - inevitable in a full-scale
pandemic, due to staff illness, presentation of new influenza cases and
redeployment, e.g. for mass vaccination
- health promotion - dissemination of the above messages to health
professionals and the general public
For a more detailed discussion on the measures proposed please see the
current flu pandemic plans, below. Although these plans mainly deal
with NHS bodies, all organisations - public or private, healthcare or
non-healthcare - will potentially be affected.
Of particular note is that whilst
prison healthcare
has recently become the formal responsibility of the local NHS Primary Care
Trust, the Home Office and
Prison Service are also
involved in contingency arrangements. A recent Prison Service
Instruction (PSI) has been issued on pandemic planning in prisons:
PSI 29/2006 - Contingency planning for pandemic influenza (Word document
289kb, HM Prison Service, Oct 2006)
Rapid response and containment
The WHO has recently started consulting on a strategy to try to avert an
imminent flu pandemic by rapid treatment of cases and prophylaxis. A
paper last year set out one method by which widespread prophylaxis may be
able to prevent a pandemic.
WHO protocol for rapid response and containment (WHO, May 2006)
Ferguson et al, Nature DOI:
10.1038/nature04017 [?]
(Nature, Sep 2005)
Actions recommended depend on the stage of a pandemic and can be divided
up by Alert level:
Current DH Alert level (0-4): 0
No cases anywhere in world (i.e. of human infection with a new
subtype capable of spreading easily between humans)
Current WHO Pandemic Alert level (1-6): 3
More...
Human infection with a new subtype but no human-to-human spread
or at most rare instances of spread to close contacts
(See DH/WHO pandemic plans, below, for more information on Alert levels.)
National - latest plans
Pandemic flu national framework
(DH, Nov 2007)
HPA flu pandemic contingency plan (Sep 2006)
HPA clinical guidelines for suspected avian influenza
(regularly updated)
National - other plans
DH contingency plan (Oct 2005) |
Operational guidance (May 2005)
Antiviral strategy (Oct 2005) |
Infection control guidance (Oct 2005)
DH/HPA clinical guidelines during a flu pandemic (Mar 2006)
BMA/RCGP
infection control in primary care guidance (May 2006)
Prison Service PSI 29/2006 (Word document 289kb, HM Prison Service, Oct
2006)
DH NHS emergency planning guidance (Oct 2005)
Cabinet Office civil contingency plan (July 2006, pdf, 260kb)
Pandemic flu checklist for businesses (Cabinet Office, May 2006, pdf,
129kb)
DfES schools and children's services contingency plan (Teachernet, June
2006)
International
WHO strategic action plan for pandemic influenza (2006)
WHO flu pandemic plan (Nov 2005)
WHO infection control guidance (Apr 2006)
Local plans in the Thames Valley area
Influenza planning in the Thames Valley has been co-ordinated by a Thames
Valley Influenza Pandemic Committee (TVIPC, SHA level), with three County
Committees (Berks, Bucks and Oxon) sitting beneath this to help develop
local plans. A Thames Valley SHA plan and plans for each
county/locality area exist, and most NHS organisations within the region now
have detailed operational plans. Importantly, it is recognised that
pandemic planning is an ongoing process and plans will evolve as new
information becomes available. With the reorganisation of the SHAs, South Central SHA (the result of the merger between TVSHA and
Hampshire/Isle of White SHA) is now continuing the planning role. The most recent pandemic
influenza plans for the South Central area can be found on the
NHS South Central website.
The first table-top exercise of the draft plan for the health sector took
place in the Thames Valley on 28 September 2005. The aim of this
exercise was to raise awareness of the potential problems faced in a
pandemic and attempt to iron out any major faults with the plan.
It was clear from the exercise that whilst there could be potentially
large upsets to essential services early on in a pandemic, the basic
messages of encouraging self-care, rigid infection control and hand hygiene
measures, and timely dissemination of this information to the public and
healthcare professionals, could avoid many problems.
Much work has gone on since the last exercise of the plans, and a further
test was carried out on 4 April 2006. The scenarios used in this
exercise are available below:
Flu pandemic tabletop exercise April 2006 (pdf, 58kb)
Major health agencies' general information websites
DH flu pandemic pages |
CMO feature on pandemic influenza
UK National
Influenza Pandemic Committee
HPA avian influenza pages |
Guidelines for investigating and reporting suspected cases of avian
influenza in the UK
WHO avian
influenza pages
ECDC (European
Centre for Disease Prevention & Control) avian flu pages
CDC avian influenza pages |
US Government PandemicFlu.gov site
Information for public/lay audience
NHS Direct
Pandemic flu information page
DH: Pandemic Flu information leaflet in English and other languages
DH: Leaflet and poster with advice for travelling to H5N1-infected countries
(DH, March 2006)
Updates on clinical presentation and management of human H5N1
de Jong et
al, NEJM (2005) 353: 2667-2672 (NEJM, Dec 2005)
Doctors.net/HPA CME module (Doctors.net.uk
- requires registration, Dec 2005)
de Jong et al, Journal of Clin Virol (2005) (JCV, Oct 2005, Epub)
WHO, NEJM
(2005) 353:1374-1385 (NEJM, Sep 2005)
Other resources
UK Resilience (Civil
Contingencies Secretariat) website |
Avian influenza
page